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INTRODUCTION
In today’s global economy, parties are increasingly dependent on
international trade.1 This increase in trade has spurred transnational
litigation, ranging from Nicaraguan banana workers suing Dole in the
United States2 to a United States branch of a United Kingdom-based 
corporation suing a Saudi Arabian corporation in the Kingdom of
Bahrain.3 In the latter case, the plaintiff successfully obtained
recognition—the act of adopting another court’s judgment—of the
Bahraini judgment in a New York state court.4 The plaintiff then attempted
to enforce the New York judgment in District of Columbia and
1. Rapture Shipping, Ltd. v. Allround Fuel Trading B.V., 350 F. Supp. 2d
369, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“The importance of extending comity . . . has only
increased as our economy has become increasingly global and dependent upon
international commerce.”).
2. First Amended Complaint, Tellez v. Dole Food Co., No. BC312852, 2004
WL 5468592 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. Cnty. Sept 7, 2004). For a discussion of the 
Dole litigation saga, see Armin Rosencranz & Stephen Roblin, Tellez v. Dole: 
Nicaraguan Banana Workers Confront the U.S. Judicial System, 7 GOLDEN GATE 
U. ENVTL. L.J. 113 (2014).
3. Standard Chartered Bank v. Ahmad Hamad Al Gosaibi & Bros. Co., 957
N.Y.S.2d 602 (Sup. Ct. 2012).
4. Id.
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9172020] COMMENT
Pennsylvania state courts.5 These two courts, however, disagreed on their
obligations to enforce the judgment.6 
Such diverging state recognition and enforcement laws are common.7 
Congress has abstained from standardizing the states’ obligations to 
recognize and enforce foreign judgments,8 thereby permitting individual
states to develop their own standards for foreign judgment recognition and
enforcement.9 Because the United States Supreme Court generally cannot
review these state court decisions, states lack a central reviewing body that
would foster uniformity.10 Divergent state treatment and lack of Supreme
Court review undermine the predictability critical to the smooth
functioning of businesses.11 
In some states, the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments
is a product of the common law rather than the legislature.12 The genesis 
of foreign judgment recognition in common law is found in Hilton v. 
Guyot, wherein the Supreme Court held in 1895 that foreign judgment
5. Ahmad Hamad Al Gosaibi & Bros. Co. v. Standard Chartered Bank, 98
A.3d 998, 1005 (D.C. 2014); Standard Chartered Bank v. Ahmad Hamad Al 
Gosaibi & Bros. Co., 99 A.3d 936 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014).
6. The differing results turned on the applicability of the United States
Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause to foreign judgments recognized by a
sister state. Ahmad Hamad Al Gosaibi, 98 A.3d at 1005; Standard Chartered
Bank, 99 A.3d at 936.
7. For a general discussion of non-uniformity among states, see Ronald A.
Brand, The Continuing Evolution of U.S. Judgments Recognition Law, 55 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT’L L. 277 (2017).
8. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 481 cmt. g
(AM. LAW INST. 1987).
9. Id. Congress has, however, enacted specific legislation related to foreign
libel judgments. Securing the Protection of Our Enduring and Established
Constitutional Heritage Act, Pub. L. No. 111–223, 124 Stat. 2480 (codified at 28
U.S.C. §§ 4101–05 (2012)).
10. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay, 223 U.S. 185 (1912) (holding that the
Court lacked jurisdiction to review a state court decision on foreign judgment
recognition because it did not implicate any right protected by the Constitution).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 481 cmt. a
(“Ordinarily, a decision of a State court granting or denying recognition to a 
foreign judgment is not subject to review by the United States Supreme Court,
unless the decision raises questions under the United States Constitution, for
example, intrusion into the foreign affairs of the United States.”).
11. Rapture Shipping, Ltd. v. Allround Fuel Trading B.V., 350 F. Supp. 2d
369, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Affording foreign courts a measure of deference
brings a degree of predictability to international commerce that is critical to a
smooth functioning of business.”).
12. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 481.
344404-LSU_80-3_Text.indd  262 8/17/20  7:19 AM




    
 
     
   
  
  




   
   
  
      
   
  
 
     
   
   
     
   
 
    
  
     
      
    
   
   
   
  
   












918 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
recognition was a federal issue and was governed by international law.13 
By 1926, however, state courts began rejecting Hilton, viewing foreign
judgment recognition as an issue of state rather than international law.14 
After Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,15 federal courts in diversity actions
also began employing state recognition laws.16 As a result, state common 
law as employed in both state and federal court is as untethered to a central
reviewing body as state statutes, further straining uniformity and
predictability.17 
In an attempt to harmonize the diverging state practices, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“Uniform Law
Commission” or “ULC”) promulgated a uniform statute with a list of
factors that courts use in determining whether to recognize a foreign
judgment.18 Although statutes and interpretation continue to vary among
states,19 a uniform statute injects predictability through similar statutory 
language.20 This added predictability has enticed the majority of states to
enact a variant of the uniform recognition act.21 
13. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 228 (1895).
14. See, e.g., Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 152 N.E.
121, 123 (N.Y. 1926).
15. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
16. See, e.g., Somportex Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435,
440 (3d Cir. 1971).
17. See, e.g., Alberta Sec. Comm’n v. Ryckman, 30 P.3d 121 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2001).
18. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 1962); UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION
ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2005).
19. Compare Ahmad Hamad Al Gosaibi & Bros. Co. v. Standard Chartered
Bank, 98 A.3d 998, 1005 (D.C. 2014), with Standard Chartered Bank v. Ahmad
Hamad Al Gosaibi & Bros. Co., 99 A.3d 936 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014). See also infra
text accompanying note 162 (describing disagreement between New York and
D.C. courts on Full Faith and Credit Clause’s implications on foreign judgments).
20. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895) (“The most certain guide, no
doubt, for the decision of such questions is a treaty or a statute of this country.”).
Although Justice Gray’s comment is in support of a federal statute, the added
predictability a state statute gives to a state is equivalent to that of a federal statute
to federal law.
21. Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, UNIFORM L.
COMMISSION, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?Com
munityKey=9c11b007-83b2-4bf2-a08e-74f642c840bc [https://perma.cc/SW23-
6QHF] (last visited June 1, 2020) (Alabama, Arizona, California, Colorado,
Delaware, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Washington);
344404-LSU_80-3_Text.indd  263 8/17/20  7:19 AM







   
 
   
   
   
   





    
   
  
 






   
  
 
       
   
     
    
 
       
       
    
   
  
 
    
    
 
  
   
 
      
9192020] COMMENT
Louisiana, however, has not enacted a uniform recognition act. In
1985, the Louisiana Legislature enacted the Uniform Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments Act (“EFJA”), which was intended to codify the state’s
obligation to recognize sister-state judgments under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause of the United States Constitution.22 Somewhat confusingly, 
the use of “foreign” in the EFJA refers to U.S. court judgments foreign to
the enacting state, not foreign to the country. Under recognition laws, on
the other hand, “foreign” refers to foreign-country judgments.23 Moreover,
the EFJA enforces sister-state judgments, whereas the recognition act
recognizes foreign-country judgments.24 The EFJA thus serves a
fundamentally different purpose than recognition acts, and the recognition
process is a condition precedent to the enforcement process.25 
In part due to confusion from non-uniformity of state recognition laws,
litigants in Louisiana have attempted to use the EFJA to recognize and
enforce foreign court judgments.26 In Baker & McKenzie Advokatbyra v. 
Thinkstream, the plaintiff attempted to enforce a Swedish judgment under
the EFJA.27 The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal held that the 
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, 
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?CommunityKey=a
e280c30-094a-4d8f-b722-8dcd614a8f3e [https://perma.cc/2FLA-8A5P] (last
visited June 1, 2020) (Alaska, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, U.S. Virgin Islands, Virginia, and
Washington).
22. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1. Act No. 464, 1985 La. Acts 882 (codified
at LA. REV. STAT. §§ 13:4241–47 (1985)).
23. Baker & McKenzie Advokatbyra v. Thinkstream Inc., 20 So. 3d 1109,
1117–20 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2009). See UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS
RECOGNITION ACT.
24. REVISED UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT, Prefatory
Note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1964); UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS
RECOGNITION ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1962).
25. The EFJA’s enforcement purpose may complement the Recognition
Acts’ recognition purpose in some jurisdictions. After recognition of the foreign-
country judgment in a U.S. court, a party may enforce that sister-state recognized
judgment through the EFJA. See Rodney Page & Joseph Smallhoover, Enforcing
Non-US Court Judgments in the US Can Be Difficult, LAW 360 (Aug. 15, 2017,
11:55 AM), https://www-law360-com/articles/954145/enforcing-non-us-court-
judgments-in-the-us-can-be-difficult [https://perma.cc/TY75-C3UN].
26. See, e.g., Rouffanche v. D’Spain, 506 So. 2d 218 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir.
1987).
27. Baker, 20 So. 3d at 1109.
344404-LSU_80-3_Text.indd  264 8/17/20  7:19 AM




    
 
 
   
    
      
   
 
  
     
     
  
   







    
        
   
 
 
   
     
  
 
     
     
  




   
       
       
920 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
EFJA does not apply to foreign judgments.28 Approving of the Baker
court’s holding, the Louisiana Legislature added an official Editor’s Note
to the procedural code article governing foreign judgment enforcement,
affirming that the EFJA is inapplicable to foreign judgments.29 Under this
standard, a Louisiana plaintiff can only enforce the judgment by filing an
action on the judgment, which requires the plaintiff to argue the case a
second time and affords the defendant an undeserved second chance to
defend with a full due-process trial.30 
The Baker court’s judicial solution, however, is insufficient.
Louisiana, as a mixed jurisdiction,31 retains a rich civilian heritage that has
limited its sources of law to legislation and custom.32 Yet, despite its
civilian tradition, Louisiana courts have long recognized a “systemic
respect” for jurisprudence, and the Louisiana Supreme Court considers its
decisions binding.33 Even if the Louisiana Supreme Court were to adopt
the Louisiana First Circuit’s holding in Baker, however, Louisiana would
still be without a clear standard governing foreign judgment recognition
law because the only issue presented to the Baker court was whether a
foreign judgment could be enforced through the EFJA. Notably
unanswered in Baker is the question of judgment recognition.
28. Id. at 1111.
29. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2541 (2017).
30. An important distinction between the original and second trial, however,
is that the first trial is centered on the merits of the original cause of action,
whereas the second trial hinges on whether the foreign judgment should be
recognized under principles of comity. REVISED UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT, Prefatory Note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1964) (“While 
there is no constitutional requirement that a debtor who has had a full due process
trial in one state need be given a second full scale trial on the judgment in another
state, this is the only course generally available to creditors.”); Baker, 20 So. 3d 
at 1119 n.10 (noting that the plaintiff must file an action on the judgment and “is 
therefore subject to the same rules for pleading and trial . . . . And, in contrast to
the ex parte grant of a judgment under [the EFJA], . . . a trial is required [in an
ordinary proceeding.]”).
31. Louisiana is often considered a “mixed jurisdiction”—a term that
attempts to describe civilian legal tradition roots overlaid with common law
tradition attributes. Mary Garvey Algero, The Sources of Law and the Value of
Precedent: A Comparative and Empirical Study of a Civil Law State in a Common
Law Nation, 65 LA. L. REV. 775, 780 (2005).
32. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1 (2017).
33. See, e.g., Doerr v. Mobile Oil Corp., 774 So. 2d 119, 129 (La. 2000).
344404-LSU_80-3_Text.indd  265 8/17/20  7:19 AM



















   
 
  
   
   
     
   
 
     
  
  
    
   
  
   
  
   
     
    
    
  
   
 
 
     
      
9212020] COMMENT
Uncertainties following Baker may lead to unpredictability burdening
Louisiana claimants.34 
Louisiana needs a statute that governs the recognition of foreign
judgments and clarifies the enforcement procedure and its limitations.
Louisiana’s EFJA, besides being prone to causing confusion,35 is too
narrow to serve both as a recognition standard and an enforcement
procedure.36 
Part I of this Comment presents the background of foreign judgment
recognition law, sketches its transition from a federal to a state concern,
and demonstrates diverging state practices causing predictability’s demise.
Part II discusses the major Louisiana court decisions and legislation
regarding foreign judgments. Part III surveys and analyzes constitutional
challenges a proposed statute may face, drawing from the Uniform Law
Commission and the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations. Part IV
concludes with a proposed statute and argues that Louisiana must codify
its recognition standard to enable clear enforcement procedure for foreign 
judgments recognized by sister states. 
I. DEVELOPING A RECOGNITION FRAMEWORK: FRANKENSTEIN’S 
MONSTER OF PIECEMEAL STATE LAW
The recognition of a foreign judgment and its subsequent enforcement
are two distinct topics.37 Recognition refers to a court in the United States
accepting a foreign court’s determination of the parties’ legal rights and 
34. An uncertainty, for example, is whether the Baker decision is limited to
foreign judgments in the recognition stage or if it also bars a plaintiff’s use of the
EFJA to enforce a foreign judgment subsequently recognized by a sister state.
Neither the legislative comments nor Baker answer this question.
35. Baker, 20 So. 3d at 1119 (recognizing “that a reading of Article 2541 may
give the impression” that the EFJA is applicable when it is not).
36. The Uniform Law Commission did not intend that the EFJA serve both
purposes. The EFJA establishes a procedure for enforcement; the Recognition
Acts establish standards for recognition. REVISED UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT, Prefatory Note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1964); UNIF.
FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1962);
UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (UNIF. LAW 
COMM’N 2005).
37. The discussion of “foreign judgments” in this Comment refers
exclusively to foreign-country judgments, not a judgment of one state in the
United States being enforced in another. Judgments of the latter sort will be called
“sister-state judgments.” See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW § 481 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
344404-LSU_80-3_Text.indd  266 8/17/20  7:19 AM




   
    
  






     
  




   
    
  
    
 
  
   
 
     
 
      
     
 
  
     
 
 
     
    
      
   
   
   
   
      
    
922 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
obligations.38 Once recognized, the judgment has the same credit and
effect as any other judgment the court issues.39 Enforcement, however,
refers to a separate action that the judgment creditor utilizes to execute the
recognized judgment.40 A judgment creditor can collect on the recognized
judgment in an enforcement proceeding just like any other judgment by
the court.41 
A. The Origins of Comity
In the United States, states must recognize and enforce sister-state 
judgments because of their dual obligations in the federalism structure— 
an obligation to the United States and to the several states.42 A state court,
however, does not share that bond with foreign countries. Because the
United States is not a member of any international body in the same way
that individual states are members of the United States, federal courts are
not obligated to recognize foreign judgments under an international
equivalent to the Full Faith and Credit Clause.43 Nevertheless, federal and
state courts have recognized foreign judgments under the principle of
comity since the seminal case of Hilton v. Guyot in 1895.44 
Comity is the practice of giving a foreign nation’s laws and judicial
acts effect beyond the territorial boundaries of the foreign nation.45 In
Hilton, the Supreme Court established that the principles of comity and
international duty may require U.S. courts to recognize and give effect to
foreign judgments.46 Hilton involved two American defendants entangled
38. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4 
cmt. 2.
39. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 481 cmt. c.
40. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4 
cmt. 2.
41. Id. at § 7 cmt. 3. Recognition is a condition precedent to enforcement. Id. 
at § 4 cmt. 2 (“Because the forum court cannot enforce the foreign-country
judgment until it has determined that the judgment will be given effect,
recognition is a prerequisite to enforcement of the foreign-country judgment.”).
42. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1.
43. See, e.g., Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Recognition of
Foreign Adjudications: A Survey and a Suggested Approach, 81 HARV. L. REV.
1601 (1968); Courtland H. Peterson, Foreign Country Judgments and the Second
Restatement of Conflict of Laws, in RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 138 (Linda J. Silberman & Franco Ferrari eds., 2017).
44. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
45. Comity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
46. Hilton, 159 U.S. 113.
344404-LSU_80-3_Text.indd  267 8/17/20  7:19 AM




   
  
    
  
   
   
  
 
   
  







    
   
 
  




    
  
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
      
     
 
  
      
   
   
   
9232020] COMMENT
in a contractual dispute with Guyot, a French national.47 Guyot
successfully sued the defendants in France and was again successful on
appeal.48 But before Guyot collected on the judgment, the defendants
divested all of their property interests in France and returned to New
York.49 Guyot quickly brought suit in New York to collect on the French
judgments, and the dispute eventually came before the Supreme Court of
the United States.50 
Justice Gray, writing for the majority in Hilton, first noted the general
rule that although national law lacks inherent extraterritorial effect,
individual nations may allow foreign laws and judicial acts to operate
extraterritorially under the principles of comity.51 Comity, in turn, is
“neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere
courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one
nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial
acts of another nation.”52 After meticulously surveying foreign judgment
recognition law from around the world,53 Justice Gray crafted the legal
standard for recognizing foreign judgments in the United States that
continues to form the backbone of foreign judgment laws on comity.54 
Under the Hilton factors, a court ought to extend comity if the foreign 
proceeding: (1) provided an opportunity for a full and fair trial; (2) was
before a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) gave proper notice to the
defendant; (4) was in a system of jurisprudence likely to secure the
impartial administration of justice; (5) lacked prejudice in the court and 
applicable law; and (6) was devoid of fraud in procuring the judgment.55 
At the end of the opinion, Justice Gray added one factor that bars comity’s 
application: reciprocity.56 
Through the principle of reciprocity, a court recognizes and gives
effect to a foreign court’s judgment only if that foreign court similarly
47. Id. at 114.
48. Id. at 115.
49. Id. at 115–16.
50. Id. at 113.
51. Id. at 163.
52. Id. at 163–64.
53. Justice Gray’s opinion in Hilton spans over 116 pages and has been called
“the most detailed exposition by any American court of the principles governing
the extraterritorial recognition and enforcement of judgments rendered in foreign
nations.” Willis L.M. Reese, The Status in this Country of Judgments Rendered
Abroad, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 783, 790 (1950).
54. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163–66.
55. Id. at 202.
56. Id. at 202.
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924 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
recognizes the first court’s judgments.57 Although the facts in Hilton
satisfied the enumerated factors, suggesting the propriety of applying
comity,58 Justice Gray ultimately denied recognizing Guyot’s French
judgment for want of reciprocity.59 Because a French court would not
recognize a U.S. judgment, the United States Supreme Court would not
recognize Guyot’s French judgment.60 
B. Recognition and Enforcement as a State Responsibility
Hilton’s unambiguous statement that the principle of comity arises
from an international duty61 clarified that foreign judgment recognition
was a matter of federal rather than state concern.62 As a federal concern,
state and federal courts applied international law instead of state law and 
looked to the Supreme Court for guidance.63 The Supreme Court, however,
has not reviewed a foreign judgment recognition case since Hilton in 
1895.64 Without subsequent guidance, the nuances of Hilton’s 
underdeveloped factors remained unclear.65 
The lack of Supreme Court guidance and federal legislation66 helped
pave the way for state law to displace federal law in foreign judgment
57. Id. at 205.
58. Id. at 202–03.
59. Id. at 209–28.
60. Id. at 227. Because international law had already recognized Hilton’s 
reciprocity requirement, id. at 228, it is unclear whether Justice Gray intended
states to be bound by the reciprocity rule as well. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1988) (“The Hilton case involved
an appeal from a lower federal court, and the opinion did not discuss whether the
rule it announced as to reciprocity would be binding on State courts.”).
61. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163–64.
62. Melinda Luthin, U.S. Enforcement of Foreign Money Judgments and the
Need for Reform, 14 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 111, 116 (2007).
63. RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS
AND PROPOSED FEDERAL STATUTE, Introduction (AM. LAW INST. 2006).
64. Linda J. Silberman, The Need for a Federal Statutory Approach to the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Country Judgments, in 26TH SOKOL
COLLOQUIUM, FOREIGN COURT JUDGMENTS AND THE UNITED STATES LEGAL 
SYSTEM 101, 102 (Paul B. Stephan ed., 2013) (stating that Hilton was “[t]he only
Supreme Court case dealing with the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
country judgments.”).
65. Luthin, supra note 62, at 116.
66. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 481 cmt. g
(AM. LAW INST. 1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 
(AM. LAW INST. 1988). Cf. Although Congress has not passed any laws on the
344404-LSU_80-3_Text.indd  269 8/17/20  7:19 AM




    
    
  
   
  





    
     
    
   
 
    
 








    
     
 
      
    
      
      
   
    
    
   
   
    
   
  




enforcement.67 Justice Fuller’s dissent in Hilton served as the primary 
rationale for rejecting federal law in favor of state law.68 Justice Fuller
disagreed with the majority’s view that international law should govern
the enforcement of foreign judgments.69 Instead, Justice Fuller viewed
foreign judgments as private rights that should be enforced by the ordinary
and simple doctrine of res judicata,70 resting on the public policy ground
that there must be an end to litigation.71 In adopting a private rights view 
of foreign judgment enforcement, Justice Fuller noted: “Now, the rule is
universal in this country that private rights acquired under the laws of
foreign states will be respected and enforced in our courts unless contrary
to the policy or prejudicial to the interests of the state where this is sought
to be done[.]”72 The private rights and res judicata framework that Justice
Fuller espoused existed quietly for over 30 years before New York’s
highest state court adopted it.73 
In 1926, the New York Court of Appeals adopted Justice Fuller’s
dissent in Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique.74 As Justice
Fuller did in Hilton, the New York court framed foreign judgment
enforcement as a private right.75 Framing the issue as a private right
allowed the Johnston court to use New York common law rather than
international law as required by Hilton.76 By distinguishing Hilton,77 the 
general recognition of foreign judgments, Congress has enacted specific
legislation related to foreign libel judgments. Securing the Protection of Our
Enduring and Established Constitutional Heritage Act, Pub. L. No. 111–223, 124
Stat. 2480 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 4801–05 (2012)).
67. Luthin, supra note 62, at 116.
68. See Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 152 N.E. 121, 123
(N.Y. 1926).
69. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 233 (1895) (Fuller, J., dissenting).
70. Res judicata, literally “a thing adjudged,” refers to an issue that has been
definitively settled between parties by a court, where the finality of the suit bars
relitigating the claim. See Res Judicata, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
71. Hilton, 159 U.S. at 229 (Fuller, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 233 (Fuller, J., dissenting).
73. Johnston, 152 N.E. 121.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 123.
77. The Johnston court reached “the conclusion that this court is not bound
to follow the Hilton Case” by limiting Hilton’s scope “to the questions actually
decided.” Id. The court dismissed “the preceding 54 pages of the opinion . . . as 
magnificent dictum, entitled to the utmost respect, but not determinative of the
question.” Id.
344404-LSU_80-3_Text.indd  270 8/17/20  7:19 AM





   
   
   
   
   
   
 
      
   
     
    












   
 
    
    
     
    
     
      
   
  
    
    
 
   
   
  
      
 
926 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
New York Court of Appeals signaled to other state courts the availability
of an alternative foreign judgment enforcement to Hilton.78 
Federal courts quickly recognized the primacy of state law in foreign
judgment recognition as well. In 1926, the Supreme Court in Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins79 rejected its past holdings based on natural law,80 finding 
it unconstitutional to create federal general common law.81 Thus, federal
courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction had to look to the substantive law 
that the state court would use.82 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has
78. See, e.g., Tonga Air Servs., Ltd. v. Fowler, 826 P.2d 204, 208 (Wash.
1992) (rejecting Hilton in foreign judgment enforcement); Nicol v. Tanner, 256
N.W.2d 796, 801 (Minn. 1976) (declining to adopt the doctrine of Hilton).
79. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
80. The positivism movement is most eloquently phrased by a dissenting
Justice Holmes: 
It is very hard to resist the impression that there is one august corpus, to
understand which clearly is the only task of any Court concerned. If there
were such a transcendental body of law outside of any particular State 
but obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute, the Courts
of the United States might be right in using their independent judgment
as to what it was. But there is no such body of law. The fallacy and
illusion that I think exist consist in supposing that there is this outside
thing to be found. Law is a word used with different meanings, but law 
in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not exist without some
definite authority behind it. The common law so far as it is enforced in a
State, whether called common law or not, is not the common law
generally but the law of that State existing by the authority of that State
without regard to what it may have been in England or anywhere else.
Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer
Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533–34 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
81. Erie did not abolish common law as a whole; rather, it rejected federal
general common law that purported to impose substantive law on the states when
the federal government lacked the constitutional authority and where the area was 
outside the federal government’s competence. On the latter point, federal courts
will not look to state law where there is a federal interest, such as when the Act of
State doctrine is implicated. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376
U.S. 398 (1964) (applying the Act of State doctrine as a matter of federal common
law). Brand, supra note 7, at 287.
82. Federal courts deciding foreign judgment enforcement disputes are likely
to be in diversity jurisdiction because the suits typically involve at least one
foreign party, making Erie particularly pivotal for foreign judgment recognition.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1)–(4) (2012). See, e.g., Somportex, Ltd. v. Phila.
Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435, 440 (3d Cir. 1971) (“[B]ecause our
jurisdiction is based solely on diversity, ‘the law to be applied . . . is the law of
the state.’”).
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refrained from reviewing the state rules, clarifying that the recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments does not present a federal question.83 
Although Erie does not foreclose all opportunity to apply federal law, its
application solidifies that foreign judgment recognition is primarily within
the province of the states.84 
C. Uniform Acts for Foreign Judgment Recognition and Enforcement
The aftermath of Hilton left the states to independently enact laws for
the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.85 Although Hilton
marked the genesis of U.S. foreign judgment law, provoking fundamental
similarities among the varying state laws,86 the fact that each state
developed its own set of laws governing foreign judgments unsurprisingly
created inconsistencies.87 
When differences among state court decisions arise, the Supreme
Court generally cannot review the decisions.88 This lack of a central
reviewing body perpetuates differences among the states and frustrates
predictability.89 The states’ uses of varying sources of law also decreases 
uniformity. For example, some state courts continue to cite Hilton in 
83. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay, 223 U.S. 185 (1912); see also infra
text accompanying note 88.
84. Silberman, supra note 64, at 102 (“[S]tate common law appeared to
govern the question of whether a foreign country judgment was entitled to
recognition and enforcement both in state and federal courts.”).
85. Luthin, supra note 62, at 117–18.
86. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW
§§ 481–82 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
87. Luthin, supra note 62, at 118–19.
88. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay, 223 U.S. 185 (1912) (holding that the
Court lacked jurisdiction to review a state court decision on foreign judgment
recognition because it did not implicate any right protected by the Constitution);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 481 cmt. a
(“Ordinarily, a decision of a State court granting or denying recognition to a 
foreign judgment is not subject to review by the United States Supreme Court,
unless the decision raises questions under the United States Constitution, for
example, intrusion into the foreign affairs of the United States.”).
89. Compare Reading & Bates Constr. Co. v. Baker Energy Res. Corp., 976
S.W.2d 702 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998) (refusing to enforce a Louisiana court’s
recognition of a judgment rendered abroad), with Standard Chartered Bank v.
Ahmad Hamad Al Gosaibi & Bros. Co., 99 A.3d 936 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014)
(holding that foreign judgments recognized in state courts are sister-state
judgments for purposes of enforcement).
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928 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
foreign judgment cases without mentioning any Restatements.90 Other 
states claim to follow the Restatement of Conflict of Laws,91 the 
Restatement of Foreign Relations,92 both Restatements, or even a
combination of Hilton and both Restatements.93 
The diverging state practices led the Uniform Law Commission to
promulgate the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act in 
1962 (“1962 Recognition Act”).94 The 1962 Recognition Act established a
uniform statute prescribing requirements for recognition,95 mandatory 
grounds for non-recognition,96 and discretionary grounds for non-
recognition.97 The ULC did not intend for the 1962 Recognition Act to be a
radical departure from then-existing state law.98 Instead, the ULC hoped to
increase the likelihood of foreign courts recognizing a judgment from the
United States by demonstrating reciprocal treatment.99 Beyond reciprocity,
adopting the 1962 Recognition Act helped unify statutory language among
states.100 Section 8 of the 1962 Act promotes uniformity by requiring
adopting states to interpret the Act “as to effectuate its general purpose to
make uniform the law of those states which enact it.”101 Although the 1962
Recognition Act did not prescribe a uniform enforcement procedure,102 it 
provided that foreign judgments entitled to recognition are “enforceable in
the same manner as the judgment of a sister state which is entitled to full
faith and credit.”103 
90. See, e.g., Kwongyuen Hangkee Co. v. Starr Fireworks, Inc., 634 N.W.2d
95 (2001).
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 (AM. LAW INST.
1988).
92. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 481–82; see, 
e.g., Alberta Sec. Comm’n v. Ryckman, 30 P.3d 121 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001).
93. See In re Hashim, 213 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2000).
94. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 1962).
95. Id. at §§ 1(2), 2.
96. Id. at § 4(a)(1)–(3).
97. Id. at § 4(b)(1)–(6).
98. Id. at Prefatory Note (“The Act states rules that have long been applied
by the majority of courts in this country.”).
99. Id. The 1962 Recognition Act would satisfy the reciprocity requirement 
still existing in a large number of civil law countries. Id.
100. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895) (“The most certain guide, no
doubt, for the decision of such questions is a treaty or a statute of this country.”).
101. UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 8.
102. Id. at Prefatory Note.
103. Id. at § 3.
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9292020] COMMENT
Two years later, the ULC published the 1964 Uniform Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments Act (“EFJA”)104 to codify the United States
Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause.105 The Constitution requires
that state courts give a judgment from a sister state the “same credit,
validity, and effect . . . that it has in the state where it is pronounced.”106 
The EFJA provides a speedy and economical registration method for
holders of judgments entitled to full faith and credit.107 
In 2005, the ULC promulgated the Uniform Foreign-Country Money
Judgments Recognition Act (“2005 Recognition Act”) as a revision to the
1962 Recognition Act.108 Like its predecessor, the 2005 Recognition Act
codified the then-existing law and did not present a radical change.109 The
revision: (1) updated the definitions section; (2) allocated the burden of
proof; (3) established a procedure for recognition pursuant to the revision;
(4) clarified the grounds for denying recognition for provisions with
differing interpretations in case law; and (5) established a statute of
limitations for recognition actions under the revision.110 
The majority of states have enacted the 1962 or 2005 Recognition Act,
as well as the 1964 EFJA.111 Collectively, these uniform statutes help
foster consistency in state foreign judgment recognition and enforcement
practice.112 But because individual states ultimately determine their
recognition standards, the law remains unsettled and state-specific.
104. REVISED UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 1964). The 1964 version is a revision of the original 1948 version. See
generally UNIFORM ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 1948).
105. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1.
106. Schultz v. Doyle, 776 So. 2d 1158, 1164 (La. 2001). See U.S. CONST. art. 
IV, § 1; Milwaukee Cty. v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276–77 (1935) (stating
that the Full Faith and Credit Clause was an important tool in unifying the nation
by requiring states to accept another state’s judgment “as of right, irrespective of
the state of its origin”); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 373
(1996) (directing state courts to “treat a state court judgment with the same respect 
that it would receive in the courts of the rendering State.”).
107. REVISED UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT. 
108. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (UNIF.
LAW COMM’N 2005).
109. Id. at Prefatory Note.
110. Id. 
111. Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, supra note 21;
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, supra note 21.
112. See, e.g., UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 8
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1962).
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930 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
II. THE ENFORCEABILITY OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS IN LOUISIANA
Although the majority of states have adopted either the 1962 or 2005
version of the Recognition Act, Louisiana has not.113 Instead, Louisiana
has adopted only the EFJA.114 
Prior to 2016, Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 2541
seemingly provided two procedures to make foreign judgments executory
in Louisiana courts.115 First, the article provided for enforcement by 
“ordinary proceeding,” which required the judgment creditor to file a
lawsuit to obtain recognition of the out-of-state judgment.116 As its name 
suggests, the “ordinary proceeding” is the default rule and was commonly
used prior to adopting the EFJA.117 Second, article 2541 stated that a
judgment creditor seeking enforcement “of a judgment . . . of a court of
the United States . . . , or of any other state, or of any foreign country may
either seek enforcement pursuant to [Louisiana’s EFJA] or bring an
ordinary proceeding.”118 The article, whether intentionally or
inadvertently, did not distinguish between sister-state judgments and
foreign judgments.119 This confusion resulted in a circuit split between two 
Louisiana courts of appeal in applying the EFJA. 
A. Louisiana Circuit Split
Both the Louisiana First and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeal have
considered whether the EFJA can be used to enforce a foreign judgment.120 
In Rouffanche v. D’Spain, the Louisiana Fifth Circuit considered the
applicability of the EFJA to foreign judgment enforcement.121 At the
district court level, the court ordered a French judgment enforceable by
113. See supra text accompanying note 111.
114. Act No. 464, 1985 La. Acts 882 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. §§ 13:4241– 
47 (1985)).
115. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2541 (2012).
116. Id. art. 2541(A).
117. REVISED UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT, Prefatory
Note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1964).
118. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2541(A) (2011).
119. Henry McMahon, The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure, 21 LA. L. REV.
1, 39 (1960) (“A single article in the new code provides the procedure for the
enforcement in Louisiana of a judgment of a court of another state or foreign
country.”)
120. Rouffanche v. D’Spain, 506 So. 2d 218 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 1987);
Baker & McKenzie Advokatbyra v. Thinkstream Inc., 20 So. 3d 1109 (La. Ct.
App. 1st Cir. 2009).
121. Rouffanche, 506 So. 2d 218.
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9312020] COMMENT
either ordinary action or the EFJA, seemingly at the option of the judgment
creditor.122 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the district court that
a “creditor with a foreign judgment can proceed against a debtor in
Louisiana by ordinary action” or by the EFJA.123 Ultimately, however, the 
Rouffanche court refused to enforce the judgment after finding that the
judgment creditor had failed to comply with notice requirements under
both the ordinary action and the EFJA.124 Although the Rouffanche court
denied enforcement, it only did so for lack of adequate notice; thus, the
Rouffanche court’s opinion suggests that both the EFJA and the ordinary 
procedure can be used to enforce a foreign judgment.125 
The Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal held otherwise.126 In
Baker & McKenzie Advokatbyra v. Thinkstream, the First Circuit held that
the EFJA is categorically unavailable to enforce foreign judgments.127 The
EFJA allows enforcement of “any judgment, decree, or order of a court of
the United States or of any other court which is entitled to full faith and
credit in this state.”128 Finding that foreign judgments are not entitled to 
full faith and credit, the First Circuit held that the judgment creditors in
Baker could not enforce a foreign judgment through the EFJA.129 
The Rouffanche and Baker courts had different interpretations of the
EFJA’s applicability to foreign judgments. The difference hinges on full
faith and credit’s application—specifically, whether the EFJA allows
enforcement of “any judgment,” as the Rouffanche court found, or whether
the judgment must also be from a “court which is entitled to full faith and
credit in this state.” Although the EFJA includes words limiting its scope
to judgments entitled to full faith and credit,130 article 2542’s disjunctive




126. Baker & McKenzie Advokatbyra v. Thinkstream Inc., 20 So. 3d 1109,
1118 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2009).
127. Id.
128. LA. REV. STAT. § 13:4241 (2011).
129. Baker, 20 So. 3d at 1111.
130. Louisiana’s EFJA defines a “foreign judgment” as another court’s
judgment that “is entitled to full faith and credit in this state.” LA. REV. STAT. §
13:4241.
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932 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
“or” did not include such a limitation, 131 thereby suggesting that full faith 
and credit is not required.132 
B. Statutory Interpretation 
The Baker and Rouffanche courts, having considered the same EFJA
statutory language and Code of Civil Procedure article 2541, came to
opposite conclusions on whether the EFJA is an appropriate procedural
mechanism to enforce a foreign judgment.133 Article 2541 does not limit
the EFJA’s applicability to judgments entitled to full faith and credit.134 
Article 2541, at the time of Baker and Rouffanche, provided:
A. A party seeking recognition or execution by a Louisiana court
of a judgment or decree of a court of the United States or a territory
thereof, or of any other state, or of any foreign country may either
seek enforcement pursuant to [Louisiana’s EFJA] or bring an
ordinary proceeding against the judgment debtor in the proper
Louisiana court, to have the judgment or decree recognized and
made the judgment of the Louisiana court.
B. In the latter case, a duly authenticated copy of the judgment
or decree must be annexed to the petition.135 
The plain language of the article suggests that a foreign judgment can be
enforced—at the plaintiff’s choice—through either an ordinary
proceeding or the EFJA. Indeed, even the Editor’s Notes in the Code of
Civil Procedure implicitly suggest that the Louisiana Legislature intended
no difference between the judgments of the United States and those of 
foreign countries, insofar as article 2541 is concerned.136 Without
distinguishing between sister-state and foreign-country judgments, the
131. Article 2541 allowed Louisiana courts to enforce a judgment from “a
court of the United States . . . , or of any other state, or of any foreign country . . . 
pursuant to [Louisiana’s EFJA].” LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2541 (2011)
(emphasis added).
132. Compare LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2541 (allowing foreign judgment 
enforcement without mention of full faith and credit), with LA. REV. STAT. §
13:4241 (limiting the EFJA to enforcement of foreign judgments entitled to full
faith and credit).
133. Compare Rouffanche v. D’Spain, 506 So. 2d 218 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir.
1987), with Baker, 20 So. 3d 1109.
134. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2541.
135. Id.
136. Id., Editor’s Notes.
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9332020] COMMENT
Editor’s Notes to article 2541 read: “For alternative method of enforcing
foreign judgments, see [Louisiana’s EFJA].”137 The EFJA, then, seems to
be a general alternative to ordinary proceedings. 
Unlike the EFJA, article 2541 does not contain a prefatory note tracing
its scope and purpose.138 To understand the intended limitations of article
2541,139 the Baker court discerned the legislative intent by examining the 
1985 amendment to article 2541.140 Specifically, the Baker court focused
on the article’s change from mandatory to permissive language.141 Prior to
the EFJA, article 2541 required plaintiffs to use article 2541 to make a
judgment enforceable.142 The 1985 amendment replaced the article’s 
mandate and instead made ordinary proceedings optional and the EFJA an
alternative.143 
But article 2541’s change from mandatory to permissive language is
not as telling as it may seem. As the Baker court noted, the 1985
amendments to article 2541 were made in connection with the enactment
of Louisiana’s EFJA.144 If the legislature did not change the then-
mandatory language of article 2541, the article would have been in direct
conflict with the newly enacted EFJA.145 Under the old language, a party 
seeking enforcement of a foreign judgment in Louisiana “must bring an
ordinary proceeding.”146 The legislative intent in adopting permissive
language may have been to allow use of the newly enacted EFJA while 
addressing the most obvious conflict, thus necessitating permissive 
language in article 2541. Despite this distinction, article 2541 does not, on
its own, limit its applicability to judgments entitled to full faith and credit.
137. Id.
138. See REVISED UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT, 
Prefatory Note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1964).
139. The legislative intent is important to understanding the relationship
between article 2541 and the EFJA because the “legislature is presumed to have
acted with deliberation and to have enacted a statute in light of the preceding
statutes involving the same subject matter.” La. Mun. Ass’n v. State, 893 So. 2d
809, 837 (La. 2005).
140. Baker & McKenzie Advokatbyra v. Thinkstream Inc., 20 So. 3d 1109,
1118–20 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2009).
141. Id.
142. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2541 (1985).
143. Compare LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2541 (2011), with LA. CODE CIV.
PROC. art. 2541 (1985).
144. Baker, 20 So. 3d at 1119 (“It is of interest that the same legislative act 
that promulgated [the EFJA] also amended [article] 2541.”).
145. Compare LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2541 (2011), with LA. CODE CIV.
PROC. art. 2541 (1985).
146. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2541 (1985).
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934 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
The EFJA, however, does not apply to foreign judgments by its own
terms147 because it is limited to judgments “entitled to full faith and credit,”
of which foreign judgments are not.148 This conclusion creates conflict.
Article 2541 suggests that the ordinary proceeding and EFJA are equally
available alternatives, but the EFJA alternative is limited to judgments
entitled to full faith and credit.149 
Furthermore, Louisiana Civil Code article 13 requires that “[l]aws on
the same subject matter . . . be interpreted in reference to each other.”150 
Code of Civil Procedure article 5051 has a similar mandate for civil
procedure articles.151 Specifically, article 5051 requires a liberal
construction152 of Code of Civil Procedure articles, recognizing “that rules
of procedure implement the substantive law and are not an end in
themselves.”153 Together, the Civil Code and Code of Civil Procedure
articles suggest a need for reconciling the EFJA and Code of Civil
Procedure article 2541.154 
A maxim of statutory interpretation is that special provisions derogate
from general provisions. Specifically, under the maxim of lex specialis, 
general laws give way to special laws. Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
article 2541, as a rule of general applicability, should not encroach on the
explicit limitation imposed by the EFJA, the specific statute applying to
foreign judgment enforcement.155 Despite the apparent language of article 
2541, the EFJA is not merely an alternative means of enforcement freely
147. See Act No. 464, 1985 La. Acts 882 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. §§ 
13:4241–47 (2016)).
148. Baker, 20 So. 3d at 1118–20 (“While the Full Faith and Credit Clause 
applies to the recognition and enforcement of judgments among sister states, it
does not apply to judgments rendered in foreign countries.”).
149. LA. REV. STAT. § 13:4241 (2016).
150. LA. CIV. CODE art. 13 (2016).
151. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 5051 (2017).
152. Id. (“The articles of this Code are to be construed liberally, and with due
regard for the fact that rules of procedure implement the substantive law and are
not an end in themselves.”) (emphasis added).
153. Id.
154. LA. CIV. CODE art. 13; LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 5051.
155. Medine v. Roniger, 879 So. 2d 706, 714 (La. 2004). This argument is also
supported by the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure’s rules of construction. Article
5051, titled “Liberal construction of articles,” states that the procedural rules
“implement the substantive law” and that they “are not an end in themselves.” LA.
CODE CIV. PROC. art. 5051; see also supra text accompanying notes 150–154. 
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9352020] COMMENT
available to the judgment creditor, and the EFJA does not apply to foreign
judgments.156 
III. KEY ISSUES IN STATUTORY FOREIGN JUDGMENT AND ENFORCEMENT 
LAW
Louisiana’s attempt in balancing its EFJA with the requirements of the 
Full Faith and Credit Clause illustrates a common problem for states.157 
The Full Faith and Credit Clause imposes a constitutional duty on state
courts to enforce the judicial proceedings of every other state.158 Not all
states, however, agree on the scope of this duty.159 
A. Full Faith and Credit
The Full Faith and Credit Clause clearly requires states to recognize
and enforce judgments rendered in other states160 but not foreign 
judgments.161 There is no definitive answer, however, to whether a foreign
judgment, once recognized by a state court, can be enforced in a separate
state court under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.162 This type of judgment
will be referred to as a “sister-recognized judgment.”
On the one hand, refusing to enforce a sister-recognized judgment can
be viewed as violating the Full Faith and Credit Clause.163 When a sister
state recognizes the foreign judgment, the judgment becomes a state court
judgment and is entitled to full faith and credit in all other states.164 On the
other hand, allowing enforcement of sister-recognized judgments through
156. Baker & McKenzie Advokatbyra v. Thinkstream Inc., 20 So. 3d 1109,
1118–20 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2009).
157. See, e.g., Ahmad Hamad Al Gosaibi & Bros. Co. v. Standard Chartered
Bank, 98 A.3d 998, 1005 (D.C. 2014).
158. U.S. CONST. art. IV § 1, cl. 1.
159. Compare Ahmad Hamad Al Gosaibi, 98 A.3d at 1005, with Standard
Chartered Bank v. Ahmad Hamad Al Gosaibi & Bros. Co., 99 A.3d 936 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 2014).
160. See, e.g., Milwaukee Cty. v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276–77 (1935).
161. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 98 cmt. d (AM. LAW 
INST. 1988).
162. Compare Ahmad Hamad Al Gosaibi, 98 A.3d at 1005, with Standard 
Chartered Bank, 99 A.3d at 936. Although these two cases involve the same New
York recognition judgment, the D.C. and Pennsylvania courts disagreed on
whether the New York judgment was entitled to enforcement under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause.
163. Standard Chartered Bank, 99 A.3d at 939.
164. Id.
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936 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
the Full Faith and Credit Clause might impede a state’s ability to maintain
a strict recognition law policy.165 The judgment creditor could exploit the
Full Faith and Credit Clause to enforce a judgment in a state with strict
recognition laws by first obtaining recognition in a more lenient state.166 
The principal question, then, turns on whether a court considers the
foreign-rendered judgment to retain its original identity despite sister-
recognition, or if it becomes a state judgment once recognized, displacing
its foreign identity entirely.
In Reading & Bates Construction Co. v. Baker Energy Resources
Corp., a Texas court of appeals held that a foreign judgment remains a
foreign judgment, despite sister-recognition.167 In Reading & Bates, a
Canadian patent holder obtained a favorable judgment in Canada and, after
the judgment was final,168 sought recognition of the judgment in
Louisiana.169 After Louisiana recognized the judgment,170 the plaintiff
attempted to enforce the judgment in Texas through Texas’s EFJA.171 The 
plaintiff argued that Louisiana’s recognition of the Canadian judgment
effectively transformed the Canadian judgment into a Louisiana judgment,
giving it full faith and credit.172 After noting that the United States
Supreme Court has refused to make full faith and credit an “iron-clad
rule,”173 the Texas court of appeals rejected the plaintiff’s argument and
held that a foreign judgment can only be enforced in the state where it was
recognized.174 
Although the Full Faith and Credit Clause is not iron-clad,175 the 
United States Supreme Court has noted that the Court alone defines the
165. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 302 (1942).
166. Ahmad Hamad Al Gosaibi, 98 A.3d at 1006–07.
167. See Reading & Bates Constr. Co. v. Baker Energy Res. Corp., 976 S.W.2d
702 (Tex. App. 1998) (refusing to enforce a Louisiana court’s recognition of a
judgment rendered abroad).
168. Id. at 705 (“The Canadian judgment became final when the Supreme
Court of Canada denied Baker Energy’s application for leave on June 1, 1995.”).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. Texas’s EFJA is substantially similar to Louisiana’s. Compare TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 35.003 (West 1997), with LA. REV. STAT. §§
13:4241–47 (2016).
172. Reading & Bates, 976 S.W.2d at 712.
173. Id. at 713 (citing Milwaukee Cty. v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 273
(1935)).
174. Id. at 714.
175. The Reading & Bates court noted that the Supreme Court has not made
full faith and credit an “iron-clad rule.” Id. at 713 (citing Milwaukee Cty. v. M.E.
White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 273 (1935)).
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9372020] COMMENT
scope of the Full Faith and Credit Clause exceptions.176 Additionally, the 
Court has stated that it is unaware of any such exception to money
judgments rendered in civil suits.177 
Building off of the Supreme Court, a Pennsylvania court concluded
that Pennsylvania courts have a duty under Full Faith and Credit Clause to
enforce sister-recognized judgments to the same extent as any other sister-
state judgments.178 Thus, like sister-state judgments,179 neither state public 
policy nor differences in law can bar the enforceability of sister-
recognized judgments.180 Under Pennsylvania law, a state court’s 
recognition of a foreign judgment effectively converts the foreign
judgment into a sister-state judgment.181 Before an enforcing court decides
what deference to give sister-recognized judgments, however, the 
recognizing court must address what standard it will use to determine
whether a foreign judgment is entitled to recognition at all.182 
B. Bases for Recognition in the Recognition Acts and the Restatement
The primary sources for state recognition laws are the 1962 and 2005
Recognition Acts and common law, the general trend of which is expressed
in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations (“Restatement”).183 Both 
176. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 438 (1943) (“[T]his
Court is the final arbiter of the extent of the exceptions.”).
177. Id. at 438 (“We are aware of no such exception in the case of a money
judgment rendered in a civil suit.”).
178. Standard Chartered Bank v. Ahmad Hamad Al Gosaibi & Bros. Co., 99
A.3d 936 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014).
179. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc. v. Saltzman, 609 A.2d 817, 820 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1992) (“‘A state is required to give full faith and credit to a money
judgment rendered in a civil suit by a sister state even where the judgment violates 
the policy or law of the forum where enforcement is sought.’ If the judgment was 
valid and enforceable in the rendering state, ‘[it] is equally so in all other states.’”)
(quoting Everson v. Everson, 431 A.2d 889, 896 (1981)).
180. Standard Chartered Bank, 99 A.3d 936.
181. Id. To be clear, Pennsylvania is not giving full faith and credit to the
foreign judgment—the court is giving full faith and credit to the sister-state
judgment that recognized the foreign judgment. Id. at 943.
182. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4 
cmt. 2 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2005) (“Because the forum court cannot enforce the
foreign-country judgment until it has determined that the judgment will be given
effect, recognition is a prerequisite to enforcement of the foreign-country
judgment.”).
183. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 481 (AM.
LAW INST. 1987).
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938 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
Recognition Acts and the Restatement require that a foreign judgment
satisfy three fundamental elements to be recognizable: (1) the judgment
must be final; (2) the rendering court must have had subject matter and
personal jurisdiction under a U.S. standard; and (3) the rendering judicial
system must provide impartial tribunals and due process.184 Under the
Recognition Acts and the Restatement, final judgments granting a sum of
money are enforceable unless there is a mandatory or discretionary reason
for non-recognition.185 
1. Finality of Judgment
The Recognition Acts and Restatement both require that a judgment
be final.186 The Restatement defines a final judgment187 as one that is 
entitled to execution in the rendering system and not subject to additional
proceedings in the rendering court.188 The Recognition Acts specify that
judgments must be “final, conclusive, and enforceable” where rendered.
These are distinct but related concepts.189 They are distinct in that finality 
refers to the court proceeding—the relationship between the parties and
the court; a judgment’s conclusiveness refers to legal effect between the
parties—the relationship between the parties because of court; and a
judgment’s enforceability refers to the plaintiff’s ability to utilize an
184. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 481– 
84(1)(b); UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT §§
3(a), 4(a)–(b)(3); UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT §§ 1(2),
2, 4(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1962).
185. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482; UNIF.
FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 3(a)(2); UNIF.
FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 2.
186. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 481; UNIF.
FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 3; UNIF. FOREIGN
MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 2.
187. Because the Recognition Acts are largely codifications of the 
Restatement, the same definition of “final” judgment used in the Restatement 
should apply to both Recognition Acts. In fact, the 2005 Recognition Act adopts
a similar definition of final: “A judgment is final when it is not subject to
additional proceedings in the rendering court other than execution.” UNIF.
FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 3 cmt. 3.
188. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 481 cmt. e.
189. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 3; 
UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 2.
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9392020] COMMENT
enforcement procedure to collect the judgment from the debtor—the 
relationship between the plaintiff and the new proceeding.190 
2. Jurisdiction 
Under both Recognition Acts and the Restatement, a foreign judgment
is not entitled to recognition unless the rendering court had subject matter
jurisdiction over the claim.191 When adopting uniform acts, however, state
legislatures do not always adopt the uniform statute as written.192 For 
example, although New York adopted the 1962 version of the Recognition
Act, which considers the lack of subject matter as a mandatory basis for
non-recognition, New York adopted a modified statute that demoted
subject matter jurisdiction to a discretionary basis for non-recognition.193 
Like subject matter jurisdiction, lack of personal jurisdiction is a
mandatory basis for non-recognition under the Restatement and both
Recognition Acts.194 Despite the Recognition Acts’ general rule denying 
recognition to judgments rendered without personal jurisdiction, both
Recognition Acts list conditions where a lack of personal jurisdiction in
the rendering court should not be grounds for refusing personal
jurisdiction.195 These exceptions to a lack of personal jurisdiction,
however, reflect personal jurisdiction standards in the United States.196 
Although these exceptions would allow recognition of a foreign judgment
rendered despite the rendering court’s lack of personal jurisdiction, it does
not frustrate party expectations because U.S. personal jurisdiction 
190. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 3
cmt. 3.
191. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 
4(b)(3); UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(a)(4).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 481.
192. See, e.g., N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5304(b)(1) (CONSOL. 2012).
193. Compare id. (making lack of rendering court’s subject matter jurisdiction
a discretionary ground for non-recognition), with UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-
JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(a)(3) (making lack of subject matter
jurisdiction a mandatory ground for non-recognition).
194. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 
4(b)(2); UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(a)(2);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 482(1)(b).
195. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 5(a);
UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 5(a).
196. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, Prefatory Note.
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940 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
standards apply.197 The Constitution’s procedural safeguards also ensure
U.S. courts only recognize judgments rendered by an impartial tribunal. 
3. Impartial Tribunals
Judgments from judicial systems that are unlikely to afford an impartial
trial are unenforceable under the Recognition Acts and the Restatement.198 
The impartial system of justice standard looks to a judicial system as a
whole, not the peculiarities of specific proceedings culminating in the
judgment.199 
Proceeding-specific errors made in a judicial system likely to afford 
an impartial trial, however, are also within the ambit of the Recognition
Acts and Restatement.200 Fraud by the rendering court, for example, is still
redressable.201 The Recognition Acts list fraud as a discretionary ground
for non-recognition.202 In addition to mandatory and discretionary bases
for non-recognition, there are also potential bases for non-recognition not
included in the Recognition Act, such as reciprocity.
C. Reciprocity
First required in Hilton but rejected by state courts shortly thereafter,
reciprocity203 remains among the most controversial considerations in
recognizing foreign judgments.204 Reciprocity has a tremendous capacity
to encourage and allow other nations to recognize U.S. judgments.205 The 
Uniform Law Commission promulgated the 1962 Recognition Act with
197. The Restatement provides the same result. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 481.
198. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT; UNIF.
FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT.
199. Friedrich K. Juenger, The Recognition of Money Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, in RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN 
JUDGMENTS 310, 355 (Linda J. Silberman & Franco Ferrari eds., 2017).
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(c)(2); UNIF.
FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(b)(2).
203. Reciprocity is the principle that a court recognizes and gives effect to a
foreign court’s judgment only if that foreign court similarly recognizes the first 
court’s judgments. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 205 (1895).
204. John F. Coyle, Rethinking Judgments Reciprocity, in RECOGNITION AND 
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 601, 603 (Linda J. Silberman & Franco
Ferrari eds., 2017).
205. Juenger, supra note 199, at 341.
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9412020] COMMENT
the explicit purpose of putting foreign nations on notice that U.S. courts 
would recognize foreign judgments, which in turn would satisfy the
foreign reciprocity requirements and make U.S. state judgments
recognizable in foreign courts.206 Despite neither of the Recognition Acts
mentioning reciprocity, 10 states that adopted one of the Recognition Acts
have included a reciprocity requirement.207 
But imposing a reciprocity requirement can also unfairly disadvantage
a citizen of a recognizing state who holds a judgment against a citizen of
a non-recognizing nation.208 Consider the following example. Person A, a
citizen of Louisiana temporarily doing business in a nation that does not
recognize U.S. judgments, successfully obtains a judgment in the foreign
forum against Person B. Person A, the Louisiana citizen, will be unable to
have the judgment recognized in a Louisiana court because the foreign
court does not recognize U.S. judgments, thus failing the reciprocity
requirement for recognition. Commentators have found such a result
unfair because the average citizen has no control over a state’s foreign
judgment recognition statute and related reciprocity requirements.209 
In addition to being unfair, a reciprocity requirement would be
expensive.210 The costs associated with reciprocity include judicial
administrability,211 unfairness to private litigants, and inefficiency for
parties.212 Although some costs can be mitigated,213 the costs likely 
outweigh the benefits.214 The principal benefit of reciprocity—fostering 
the recognition of U.S. judgments abroad—would be small because very
206. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, Prefatory Note.
207. Linda J. Silberman, Some Judgements on Judgments: A View from
America, in RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS 349, 374
(Linda J. Silberman & Franco Ferrari eds., 2017).
208. Juenger, supra note 199, at 341.
209. Id. (“It seems unfair to penalize private litigants—who are neither to
blame nor in a position to change matters—for the rendition state’s lack of
comity.”).
210. Coyle, supra note 204, at 608. 
211. Judicial administrability refers to the court’s determination on whether a
nation would recognize a judgment of the state’s courts. See id. at 613 nn.39–40 
(listing scholar arguments demonstrating judges lack the capacity to effectively
resolve reciprocity inquiries).
212. Id. at 612.
213. The administrative cost on courts, for example, can be mitigated by
requiring the party seeking non-recognition of a judgment to bear the burden of
proving the foreign court’s lack of reciprocity. Id. at 612–13.
214. Id. at 608.
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942 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
few nations generally deny enforcing U.S. judgments.215 Because the
benefit is insignificant on a federal level, a fortiori the benefit to Louisiana
would be truly insignificant.216 
IV. A STATUTE IS SUITABLE FOR LOUISIANA’S MIXED-JURISDICTION 
STATUS
Louisiana, more than any other state in the United States, needs a
statute to govern the recognition of foreign judgments because the Civil
Code limits the sources of law to legislation and custom.217 Although the
Civil Code minimizes the importance of jurisprudence in Louisiana,218 
scholars have long noted the systemic respect of jurisprudence in
Louisiana courts.219 Even if the courts could establish foreign judgment
recognition law, however, a comprehensive statute is a better solution than
piecemeal judicial decisions. The Louisiana Legislature, and not the 
courts, should adopt the law governing foreign judgment recognition for 
three primary reasons: (1) enacted law is a primary source of law under
the Civil Code; (2) a statute can contemplate various issues with clarity;
and (3) a statute does not subject individual litigants to put judgments at
stake to develop the law. A piecemeal framework by the courts would do
the exact opposite.220 Statutes give a clear and definite statement that
addresses all future litigants on all issues of foreign judgment recognition;
jurisprudential developments resolve only specific, narrow issues that are
submitted to courts. 
215. Austria, China, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Indonesia, Norway, Saudi
Arabia, and Sweden generally deny enforcing U.S. judgments. Id. at 658.
216. For a full discussion of reciprocity and its associated costs, see id.
217. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1 (2016). The exception is jurisprudence constante, 
which, over time, may become customary law. See id. art. 3 (explaining how
jurisprudence becomes custom under Louisiana law).
218. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 cmt. b (2019) (“According to civilian doctrine,
legislation and custom are authoritative or primary sources of law. They are contrasted
with persuasive or secondary sources of law, such as jurisprudence . . . .”).
219. Algero, supra note 31, at 779.
220. That is, a jurisprudential framework would not be a primary source of law
under the Civil Code; it would be limited to the specific issues presented to the
court for resolution; and it would subject each litigant to submit to the courts the 
enforceability of the foreign judgment before knowing what the rule governing 
the issue will be.
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9432020] COMMENT
A. Louisiana’s Mixed-Jurisdiction Legal Tradition
Louisiana is the only mixed-jurisdiction221 state in the United States.222 
Traditionally, the civil and common law traditions treat the value of
precedent differently.223 Whereas common law systems apply the doctrine 
of stare decisis, systems rooted in the civil law tradition adhere instead to 
jurisprudence constante.224 A.N. Yiannopoulos described the difference
between jurisprudence constante and stare decisis: “A single case affords
sufficient foundation for the latter, while a series of adjudicated cases, all
in accord, forms the basis for the former.”225 
True to its civil law tradition, Louisiana has codified its sources of law 
in the Civil Code, limiting those sources to legislation and custom.226 In a
purely civilian legal system, the Baker court’s opinion could be nothing
more than one judge’s interpretation of the law and would not be
binding.227 As but a single case, it could not acquire the force of law
through jurisprudence constante either.228 More to the point, the Civil
Code specifically excludes jurisprudence from being a source of primary
law.229 Under such a framework, the Baker court’s opinion cannot become 
law, and the Louisiana Legislature alone has the authority to enact a
foreign judgment recognition framework. 
Louisiana, however, is not a purely civilian legal system.230 
Louisiana’s courts treat precedent differently than its civil law parents or
its common law sister-states.231 Despite the Civil Code’s explicit reference
to jurisprudence as a secondary source of law,232 Louisiana courts have
221. Louisiana is often considered a “mixed jurisdiction.” “Mixed” refers to
Louisiana’s civilian legal tradition roots overlaid with attributes from the common
law tradition. Algero, supra note 31, at 780.
222. See generally VERNON V. PALMER, MIXED JURISDICTIONS WORLDWIDE:
THE THIRD LEGAL FAMILY 5 (2d ed. 2012).
223. Algero, supra note 31, at 779.
224. Id.
225. A.N. YIANNOPOULOS, LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW SYSTEM 55, § 35.
226. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1 (2019).
227. Algero, supra note 31, at 779.
228. As formulated by A.N. Yiannopoulos, the standard for jurisprudence
constante requires a series of cases. A single case would therefore be insufficient.
See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 225, § 35.
229. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1 cmt. b (2019).
230. See generally Algero, supra note 31.
231. Algero, supra note 31, at 781.
232. LA. CIV. CODE. art. 1 cmt. b (2019) (“According to civilian doctrine,
legislation and custom are authoritative or primary sources of law. They are contrasted
with persuasive or secondary sources of law, such as jurisprudence . . . .”).
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944 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
long recognized a “systemic respect for jurisprudence,”233 and the
Louisiana Supreme Court’s opinions are “binding” in Louisiana courts.234 
It follows that the Baker court’s holding could be adopted by the
Louisiana Supreme Court, which would in turn be binding on all Louisiana
courts. Arguendo, this result does not resolve the crux of the recognition
problem: Judgment creditors with foreign judgments would still not have
a clear procedural method for recognizing and enforcing foreign
judgments in Louisiana courts. The Baker court did not address the issue
of recognizing foreign judgments.235 It did not have to. The issue before
the Baker court was whether the EFJA could be used to enforce a foreign
judgment,236 to which the court articulated a principled opinion that the
EFJA was not enacted for that purpose and therefore may not be so used.237 
Because it was not necessary in deciding the opinion, the Baker court
did not delineate a standard for recognizing a foreign judgment, instead
noting only that the more burdensome ordinary proceeding was still
available for enforcement.238 Using the ordinary proceeding may not be 
satisfactory for a multitude of reasons—not the least of which is the
significantly increased burdens imposed relative to the EFJA’s
streamlined, ex parte enforcement method, as noted by the Baker court.239 
Moreover, ordinary process may create an unnecessary burden on
judgment creditors with a sister-recognized judgment. Once again, the
limited question presented to the Baker court produced a holding tailored
233. Algero, supra note 31, at 781.
234. See Gauthreaux v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 588 So. 2d 723, 725 (La. Ct. App.
5th Cir. 1991) (“[A]s an intermediate appellate court we are bound to follow the
precedent set by our Supreme Court.”); La. Electorate of Gays and Lesbians, Inc.
v. State, 812 So. 2d 626, 629 (La. 2002) (“[T]he law is what this court has
announced it to be . . . .”) (“This action involves, at least, a failure by the lower
court to recognize its obligation to follow the law of this State as pronounced by
this Court.”); Lucky v. Fricks, 511 So. 2d 1315, 1317 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1987)
(“Trial courts and courts of appeal are bound to follow the last expression of law
of the Louisiana Supreme Court . . . .”); see also Algero, supra note 31, at 780.
But see Constr. Materials, Inc. v. Am. Fid. Fire Ins. Co., 388 So. 2d 365 (La. 1982)
(“[T]he decisions of a court of last resort are not the law, but only evidence of
what the court thinks is the law.”); Prytania Park Hotel, Ltd. v. Gen. Star Indem.
Co., 179 F.3d 169, 175 (5th Cir. 1999) (“Jurisprudence, even when it rises to the
level of jurisprudence constante, is a secondary source in Louisiana.”).
235. See generally Baker & McKenzie Advokatbyra v. Thinkstream Inc., 20
So. 3d 1109 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2009).
236. Id. at 1118–20.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 1118.
239. Id. at 1119 n.10.
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9452020] COMMENT
to a narrow question. The corollary is that many further questions are left
unanswered, including whether the EFJA extends to sister-recognized
judgments. 
Thus, although the Louisiana Supreme Court could develop a 
recognition framework, merely adopting the Baker court’s opinion would 
not remove the need for a recognition statute in Louisiana. And, if the
Louisiana Supreme Court were to further develop the recognition
framework, a Louisiana litigant, being unable to predict what foreign
judgment recognition framework the Louisiana Supreme Court may
develop, would be forced to risk the enforceability of a judgment. Even in
situations where the perceived risk of a court denying enforcement may be
lower, such as a proceeding to enforce a sister-recognized judgment under
the EFJA, a Louisiana litigant still faces a risk of losing on the
enforcement. The Louisiana Supreme Court could determine that sister-
recognized judgments are “judicial Acts” under the meaning of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution,240 but it could
also do the opposite and decline enforcement.241 A Louisiana litigant
should not be forced to put a judgment at stake to determine the law.
Unless the legislature acts, however, that is exactly what will happen in
developing a recognition framework.
Considering the multitude of questions that judgment creditors may
have as to the scope of the Baker court’s opinion, a statute is favorable to
jurisprudence for establishing Louisiana’s foreign judgment law. Even if
the Louisiana Supreme Court were to adopt the Baker court’s opinion, the
courts would still be without a clear procedural method for enforcing a
foreign judgment. Baker’s decision held only that judgment creditors
cannot use the EFJA to enforce foreign judgments and must instead use
the ordinary proceeding, but it determined nothing more. The increased
burdens associated with ordinary procedure may not be necessary in all
situations—for example, when recognizing sister-recognized judgments if
sister-recognized judgments are determined to be entitled to full faith and
credit. A statute can explicitly state that a sister-recognized judgment is
entitled to full faith and credit and is therefore directly enforceable under
the EFJA. The statute can also provide the factors that a court ought to
consider when recognizing a foreign judgment. Moreover, a statute is a
primary source of law as contemplated by article 1 of the Civil Code.
240. See, e.g., Standard Chartered Bank v. Ahmad Hamad Al Gosaibi & Bros.
Co., 99 A.3d 936 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014).
241. See, e.g., Reading & Bates Constr. Co. v. Baker Energy Res. Corp., 976
S.W.2d 702 (Tex. App. 1998).
344404-LSU_80-3_Text.indd  290 8/17/20  7:19 AM









    





   






     
 
   
 
    
   
 
     
   
     
 
  
     
   
       
    
 
      
 
   
   
    
    
     
946 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
B. Louisiana’s Statute Must Consider Full Faith and Credit Implications
Without an international obligation similar to the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, sister-state judgments and foreign judgments remain fundamentally
different.242 Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, states have an obligation
to enforce judgments from sister states.243 In contrast, comity does not
impose an obligation to recognize foreign judgments; comity is merely a
tool used for convenience.244 The Baker court, recognizing this distinction,
held that the EFJA is inapplicable to foreign judgments.245 In apparent
approval, the Louisiana Legislature subsequently adopted this decision in an
Editor’s Note to Code of Civil Procedure article 2541.246 
The removal of the EFJA from a foreign judgment creditor’s toolbox
creates a problem similar to that which prompted the EFJA in 1964.247 The
EFJA’s prefatory notes explain that, although the United States
Constitution does not require a full due-process proceeding on the
enforcement proceeding, it was generally the only route since states had
not adopted any alternative procedures.248 In response, the Uniform Law
Commission drafted the EFJA to codify an enforcement procedure that
allowed courts to enforce sister-state judgments without requiring the
judgment creditor to prove the judgment’s validity.249 Judgment creditors
of foreign judgments face the same issue after the Baker court’s 
decision.250 According to Baker, foreign judgment creditors may only
proceed by “ordinary action.”251 As the Baker court noted, an ordinary 
action is “the same as that in any other ordinary proceeding and is therefore
subject to the same rules for pleading and trial.”252 Additionally, the 
242. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1.
243. Id.
244. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895) (stating that comity is not
“a matter of absolute obligation” but instead stems from “international duty and
convenience.”).
245. Baker & McKenzie Advokatbyra v. Thinkstream Inc., 20 So. 3d 1109,
1111 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2009).
246. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2541, Editor’s Note (2016).
247. “Drafted” here refers to the Uniform Law Commission drafting the
statute; it does not refer to the Louisiana Legislature enacting the statute. REVISED 




250. See Baker, 20 So. 3d 1109.
251. Id. at 1118–20.
252. Id. at 1119 n.10.
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9472020] COMMENT
ordinary proceeding imposes heightened citation and service requirements
and requires a trial.253 
Although the Baker decision leaves foreign judgment creditors with a
similar dilemma as sister-state judgment creditors prior to the EFJA, the
two types of judgments have a fundamental difference that warrants their
divergent treatment. Unlike sister-state judgments, foreign judgments do
not come clothed with full faith and credit.254 The Full Faith and Credit
Clause imposes a duty on states to enforce sister-state judgments,255 which
are presumed to be fair and competent.256 This presumption reflects that
decisions from any court in the United States are guided by the same
procedural safeguards and due process requirements that the Constitution 
imposes. The presumption is also supported by the fact that socioeconomic
ideas spurring the development of law are likely to be similar across
states.257 The similarity in legal consideration among states leaves few 
constitutional reasons to deny enforcement of sister-state judgments under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause.258 
In contrast, states do not have an obligation to recognize or enforce
foreign judgments and may deny doing so for several reasons.259 In
addition to the lack of an obligation, foreign judgments do not come with
a presumption of fairness.260 These differences warrant judicial inquiry
into the rendering court’s decision that would be inappropriate for a sister-
state judgment.261 But, once a court in the United States looks behind the
curtain and recognizes a foreign judgment, thereby affirming that the
judgment comports with U.S. legal standards, the distinction between
sister-state and foreign judgments disappears. The solution, then, is a
procedural system that confers full faith and credit to foreign judgments
upon recognition.
253. Id. (noting that the citation and service standards are higher than the 
EFJA’s requirements and that the ordinary procedure requires a trial, whereas the
EFJA does not).
254. Id. at 1117–20.
255. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1.
256. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 6 
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948 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
The Uniform Law Commission enacted a similar procedural system in
the 1962 and 2005 Recognition Acts.262 The Recognition Acts “provide[]
parties who have previously litigated an issue with a tool for enforcing
money judgments . . . in the same manner as the judgment of a sister state
entitled to full faith and credit.”263 This system allows for streamlined
enforcement of foreign judgments,264 and a court’s affirmative recognition
of a foreign judgment can serve as a basis for demanding that another court
grant enforcement pursuant to the Full Faith and Credit Clause.265 
A statute governing the recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments is a strong solution that many states adopt by enacting both the
EFJA and a Recognition Act.266 The Baker court correctly concluded that
the judgment creditor’s only option was through an ordinary proceeding,
denying the use of the EFJA to enforce foreign judgments.267 This EFJA 
limitation exposes Louisiana’s gap in foreign judgment law, and the
Louisiana Legislature can resolve this gap with a simple statute.
C. The Statute’s Rationale—What Law and Why
The Louisiana Legislature should enact the 2005 Recognition Act.
Many states have adopted a version of the Recognition Act, and
Louisiana’s adoption would further foster uniformity for litigants and give
Louisiana courts a wealth of statutory interpretation.268 The legislature 
would have the benefit of seeing current statutory interpretation conflicts
in other states, making it well-positioned to contemplate and directly
address the issues.269 A primary issue regarding the interplay between the
262. Id.; UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (UNIF. LAW
COMM’N 1962).
263. Aguerre v. Schering-Plough Corp., 924 A.2d 571, 578 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2007).
264. Sung Hwan Co. v. Rite Aid Corp., 850 N.E.2d 647 (N.Y. 2006).
265. Standard Chartered Bank v. Ahmad Hamad Al Gosaibi & Bros. Co., 99
A.3d 936 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014).
266. Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, supra note 21;
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act, supra note 21.
267. LA. CIV. CODE. art. 1 (2016) (recognizing the sole sources of law in
Louisiana as “legislation and custom”).
268. In deciding the applicability of the EFJA, the Baker court looked to how other
state courts have interpreted the EFJA’s applicability. Baker & McKenzie
Advokatbyra v. Thinkstream Inc., 20 So. 3d 1109, 1117 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2009).
269. Compare Ahmad Hamad Al Gosaibi & Bros. Co. v. Standard Chartered 
Bank, 98 A.3d 998, 1005 (D.C. 2014), with Standard Chartered Bank, 99 A.3d at 936.
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9492020] COMMENT
2005 Recognition Act and EFJA is whether the Full Faith and Credit
Clause applies to sister-recognized judgments.270 
1. Full Faith and Credit
Although the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not apply to the
enforcement of foreign judgments,271 courts have disagreed on whether it
becomes applicable once a state court recognizes a foreign judgment.272 
Under the Recognition Acts, a recognition proceeding culminates in a
judicial decision regarding the enforceability of a foreign judgment within
that state.273 Some states have held the judicial determination granting 
recognition to be a judicial proceeding under the meaning of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause, thus requiring other state courts to give that decision
the same effect it would have in the rendering state.274 Under this theory,
states must enforce sister-recognized judgments through the enforcement
state’s EFJA.275 Other states reject this approach, holding instead that
recognition does not implicate the Full Faith and Credit Clause.276 The
Reading & Bates court exemplified the latter reasoning, holding that each
state should be able to determine the criteria for enforcing foreign
judgments within its borders and that ceding that right through “back door”
enforcement is tantamount to ceding its state autonomy.277 
Although the Supreme Court has not specified which interpretation of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause applies to sister-recognized judgments,278 
the Court is unlikely to adopt the Reading & Bates approach for two
reasons. First, the Court has stated that a civil money judgment suit is not
an exception to the Full Faith and Credit Clause in Magnolia Petroleum
270. Compare Ahmad Hamad Al Gosaibi, 98 A.3d at 1005, with Standard 
Chartered Bank, 99 A.3d at 936.
271. See Aetna Life Ins. v. Tremblay, 223 U.S. 185, 190 (1912).
272. Compare Ahmad Hamad Al Gosaibi, 98 A.3d at 1005, with Standard 
Chartered Bank, 99 A.3d at 936.
273. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 7
(UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2005).
274. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1.
275. Standard Chartered Bank, 99 A.3d at 936.
276. Ahmad Hamad Al Gosaibi, 98 A.3d at 1005.
277. Reading & Bates Constr. Co. v. Baker Energy Res. Corp., 976 S.W.2d
702 (Tex. App. 1998).
278. The Magnolia Court did not specifically contemplate using the “back
door” for foreign judgment enforcement; its holding is limited to enforcing sister-
state judgments. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 438 (1943).
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950 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
Co. v. Hunt.279 To be sure, the Magnolia Court did not specifically address
a sister-recognized judgment; however, the Court’s use of “civil money
judgment” includes sister-recognized judgments.280 Second, the Supreme
Court has rejected the premise on which Reading & Bates is founded.281 
The Reading & Bates court refused to recognize a sister-recognized
judgment to prevent Texas courts from being used as a “back door.”282 
Previous to Reading & Bates, however, the Supreme Court had rejected 
the back door argument—where strict laws of one state could be thwarted
by a more lax state—in another policy-based case, Williams v. North
Carolina.283 The Williams Court noted that the very purpose of the Full
Faith and Credit Clause was to obligate states to recognize the laws of
other states.284 The back door is “part of the price of our federal system.”285 
Constitutional requirements, such as the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
cannot be eroded by a state statute. In drafting a statute, however,
understanding which of two diverging practices is likely to stand the test
of time is important to promote predictability and protect reasonable
expectations of parties relying on a statute. The Louisiana Legislature
should include statutory language stating that courts must enforce sister-
recognized judgments through the EFJA. Such a provision would require
very little modification of the 2005 Recognition Act.
2. The 2005 Recognition Statute Is Ideal for Louisiana
The Uniform Law Commission promulgated the 2005 Recognition
Act as an updated version of the 1962 Recognition Act.286 The 2005 Act
279. Id. (“We are aware of no such exception in the case of a money judgment
rendered in a civil suit.”).
280. Id.
281. Id.
282. The Reading & Bates court directly addressed the “back door” issue:
We reserve the right of Texas courts to evaluate foreign country
judgments accordingly. To recognize the Louisiana judgment is
tantamount to ceding that right to our sister state. We will not permit a
party to clothe a foreign country judgment in the garment of a sister
state’s judgment and thereby evade the our [sic] own recognition
process.
Reading & Bates, 976 S.W.2d at 715.
283. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 302 (1942).
284. Id. at 295 (quoting Milwaukee Cty. v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268,
376–77 (1935)).
285. Id. at 302.
286. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT,
Prefatory Note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2005).
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9512020] COMMENT
is preferable to the 1962 Act for three primary reasons. First, the 2005
Recognition Act provides a specific procedural framework for recognizing
foreign judgments not present in the 1962 version.287 The procedures
protect against litigants using the EFJA to recognize and enforce a foreign
judgment,288 which was the central issue in Baker.289 Second, the 2005 
Recognition Act establishes the effect that a court’s recognition confers to
foreign judgments.290 The effect that recognition gives foreign judgments
determines, among other things, whether courts treat the judgments as 
having full faith and credit.291 Finally, 24 states have adopted the 2005
Recognition Act, which demonstrates notable acceptance of the 2005 Act
and makes it more likely that the 2005 Recognition Act will be the
prevailing method of recognition into the future.292 Of these 24 states, 
many previously enacted the 1962 Recognition Act and replaced it with 
the 2005 Recognition Act.293 In addition, three states294 that had not
enacted any recognition law decided to enact the 2005 version, and another
state is currently considering adopting the 2005 Recognition Act.295 
Like its predecessor, the 2005 Recognition Act allows courts to
recognize foreign judgments that are final, conclusive, and enforceable
where rendered.296 Both Recognition Acts also establish three mandatory
grounds and several discretionary grounds for non-recognition.297 As to 
the effects of judgments, however, the 1962 Recognition Act provides
only that foreign judgments are enforceable to the same extent as sister-
state judgments that are entitled to full faith and credit.298 This language 
287. Id. § 6.
288. The 2005 Act provides that the EFJA cannot recognize judgments. See 
UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, § 6.
289. Baker & McKenzie Advokatbyra v. Thinkstream Inc., 20 So. 3d 1109
(La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2009).
290. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 7.
291. Id. § 7(1)–(2).
292. Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act, supra note 21.
293. California, Colorado, Georgia, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii,
Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas, Virginia, and
Washington. See id.
294. Arizona, Alabama, and Indiana. See id.
295. Tennessee Act No. 275, 2019 Tenn. Pub. Acts 1162.
296. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(a);
UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 2 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
1962).
297. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, § 
4(b)–(c); UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(a)–(b).
298. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, Prefatory Note.
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952 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 80
leaves open for courts the ability to interpret when to apply the 1962
Recognition Act’s mandatory and discretionary bases for non-
recognition.299 The 2005 Act, in contrast, explicitly establishes the
procedural framework necessary to invoke the Recognition Act300 and
further provides definitive bounds to the effects that recognition gives to a
foreign judgment.301 The thoroughness of the 2005 Recognition Act
partially explains its rapid success, and a Louisiana statute would provide
clarity with a few modifications. 
3. Necessary Amendments to Adopt the 2005 Recognition Act
The Louisiana Legislature should consider two principal issues when 
adopting the 2005 Recognition Act. First, it must provide procedures that
govern the interplay between the EFJA, the Recognition Act, and Code of
Civil Procedure article 2541. Article 2541, by its own terms, governs the
procedures applicable to recognition and enforcement of foreign country
judgments and sister-state judgments.302 The Recognition Act would 
govern recognition, which would require an amendment to article 2541.
Further, the EFJA governs enforcement, which must work in tandem with
the new Recognition Act, requiring another clarifying amendment to
article 2541’s EFJA provision and a change to the standard 2005
Recognition Act’s language. 
The second issue that the legislature should consider is the effect of
sister-recognized judgments under the modified EFJA. Because the 2005
Recognition Act provides that a recognized judgment will have the same 
effect as a judgment rendered by the recognizing court, and because a
sister-state’s decision recognizing a foreign judgment is a “judicial
Proceeding” under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, Louisiana courts
would be obligated to enforce sister-recognized judgments.303 
a. Interplay Among the Code of Civil Procedure, the 2005
Recognition Act, and the EFJA
In ensuring that the legislature seamlessly unifies the 2005 Recognition
Act with article 2541 and the EFJA, collectively forming Louisiana’s
foreign judgment laws, the legislature must modify the Recognition Act’s
standard language and amend article 2541 and the EFJA. The legislature
299. Id. 
300. Id. § 6.
301. Id. § 7.
302. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 2541 (2016).
303. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1.
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9532020] COMMENT
needs to modify only one aspect of the 2005 Recognition Act to demonstrate
its intent that the new Recognition Act works in conjunction with the EFJA.
The 2005 Recognition Act provides that courts must enforce recognized
judgments in the same manner as sister-state judgments. This language
leaves open the opportunity for litigants to creatively argue semantics. The
legislature should instead grant recognized judgments an additional effect
in the Recognition Act by explicitly stating that judgments recognized
pursuant to the Recognition Act are enforceable under the EFJA. With the
proposed changes underlined and omissions marked by strikethrough, the
effects section would provide:
SECTION 7. EFFECT OF RECOGNITION OF FOREIGN-
COUNTRY JUDGMENT. If the court in a proceeding under
Section 6 finds that the foreign-country judgment is entitled to
recognition under this [Act] then, to the extent that the foreign-
country judgment grants or denies recovery of a sum of money, the
foreign-country judgment is:
(1) conclusive between the parties to the same extent as the 
judgment of a sister state entitled to full faith and credit in this
state would be conclusive; and
(2) enforceable in the same manner and to the same extent as a
judgment rendered in this state.; and
(3) enforceable through the registration procedure provided by
EFJA. 
The suggested subsection indisputably demonstrates the legislative intent
that recognized judgments may be enforced with the EFJA. Moreover, the
addition clearly—and with more certainty than subsection two—instructs
parties how a recognized judgment may be enforced.
More important than the Recognition Act’s language, however, is the
language defining the EFJA’s scope. Indeed, the Baker court held that the 
EFJA did not apply to foreign judgments because of the EFJA’s limited
scope.304 To ensure the EFJA’s applicability to judgments recognized 
under the Recognition Act, the legislature should expand the EFJA’s
scope.305 Such an addition would provide:
304. The Baker court noted that the EFJA applied to judgments entitled to full
faith and credit, which excluded foreign judgments. Baker & McKenzie
Advokatbyra v. Thinkstream, 20 So. 3d 1109, 1117–20 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir.
2009). The full faith and credit limitation stems from the EFJA’s language in its
definitions section. LA. REV. STAT. § 13:4241 (2016).
305. Jon H. Sylvester and Richard J. Graving took a similar approach in 
addressing the 1962 Recognition Act’s deficiencies. At least as to the EFJA’s
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modification, their approach applies with equal strength in connecting the EFJA 
with the 2005 Recognition Act. Richard J. Graving & Jon H. Sylvester, Is the 
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 306. Qualifying language can defeat a statute’s application. For example, the 
Baker court held the EFJA inapplicable because its scope was limited to 
judgments entitled to full faith and credit. Baker, 20 So. 3d at 1117–20. 
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§ 4241. Definition 
 
In this Part “foreign judgment” means any judgment, decree, or 
order of a court of the United States or of any other court which is 
entitled to full faith and credit in this state, or any foreign 
judgment as defined in Section 1 of the Recognition Act. 
This simple addition allows the Recognition Act and the EFJA to work in 
harmony. Moreover, cross-referencing the two Acts, without further 
qualifying language,306  settles any doubt as to the legislative intent. 
Finally, the legislature must also amend Code of Civil Procedure 
article 2541 to reflect the new Recognition Act and the changes made to 
the EFJA. This amendment is threefold. First, the legislature should add a 
separate provision within article 2541 that creates an alternative method 
of recognizing foreign judgments. Second, the legislature must modify 
article 2541’s EFJA provision to include enforcement of judgments 
recognized pursuant to the Recognition Act. Finally, the legislature should 
distinguish or remove the Editor’s Notes to article 2541 regarding Baker, 
which state that the EFJA is inapplicable to foreign judgments. The 
proposed language should read as follows: 
Art. 2541. Execution of foreign judgments 
 
A.  A party seeking recognition or execution by a Louisiana court 
of a judgment or decree of a court of the United States or a territory 
thereof, or of any other state, or of any foreign country may bring 
an ordinary proceeding against the judgment debtor in the proper 
Louisiana court, to have the judgment or decree recognized and 
made the judgment of the Louisiana court. 
B. A duly authenticated copy of the judgment or decree must be 
annexed to the petition. 
C. A judgment, decree, or order of a court of the United States or 
any other court that is entitled to full faith and credit in this state, 
or any judgment recognized pursuant to the Recognition Act, may 
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also be enforced pursuant to R.S. 13:4241. 
D. A judgment, decree, or order of a foreign court may be 
recognized pursuant to the Recognition Act. 
 
Editor’s Notes 
For alternative method of enforcing foreign judgments, see R.S. 
13:4241.  
Baker & McKenzie Advokatbyra v. Thinkstream, 20 So.3d 1109 
(La. App. 1 Cir. 2009). Louisiana's enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments Act, R.S. 18:4241 et seq., generally allowing the 
enforcement in Louisiana of judgments of the other courts of the 
United States entitled to full faith and credit, did not apply to a 
judgment from Oregon that was a “transcribed” judgment from 
Sweden. The defendant showed clearly that Oregon had no 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Judgments from abroad 
are not subject to the full faith and credit laws of this country.  
In Prior to the Recognition Act, in order to enforce the Swedish 
judgment, it would be necessary to do it through an ordinary 
proceeding, not through the statute. 
Reference to the Recognition Act in subsections C and D are new. 
The Recognition Act provides a streamlined process for 
recognizing foreign-country money judgments and provides 
enforcement pursuant to the EFJA. The preceding note on the 
Baker court’s holding is limited to prohibiting parties from using 
the EFJA to recognize foreign judgments. The Recognition Act 
hereby removes any doubt that the EFJA may be used to enforce 
judgments recognized pursuant to the Recognition Act. 
The amended language in subsections C and D references the Recognition 
Act and the EFJA, and the addition to the Editor’s Notes summarizes the 
connection among article 2541, the EFJA, and the Recognition Act. The 
modification to the existing Editor’s Notes reinforces legislative intent by 
clarifying that the Recognition Act removes the bar on judgment 
enforcement through the EFJA. Further, the added note explicitly affirms 
that the legislature intends the Recognition Act and the EFJA to work in 
conjunction with each other and that judgments recognized pursuant to the 
Recognition Act may be enforced pursuant to the EFJA.  
b. Full Faith and Credit for Sister-Recognized Judgments Pursuant 
to the EFJA 
In addition to the seamless interplay among proposed foreign 
judgment laws, the legislature should also consider Louisiana courts’ full 
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faith and credit obligation to enforce sister-recognized foreign judgments. 
The proposed Recognition Act provides a concrete procedural system for 
recognizing and enforcing foreign judgments in Louisiana courts. Even 
with the amendments already suggested, however, Louisiana law does not 
explicitly address the enforceability of sister-recognized judgments under 
the EFJA.  
Because the United States Supreme Court would likely rule that sister-
recognized judgments are enforceable through another state’s EFJA 
procedure,307  a Louisiana statute should adopt and make known this 
standard. To provide this certainty, the legislature should modify the 
EFJA. The legislature can clarify the full faith and credit obligation in the 
EFJA by further defining applicable judgments to include sister-
recognized judgments. The proposed statute would read as follows:  
§ 4241. Definition 
In this Part “foreign judgment” means any judgment, decree, or 
order of a court of the United States or of any other court which is 
entitled to full faith and credit in this state, or any foreign 
judgment as defined in Section 1 of the Recognition Act. 
For purposes of this Section, a “judgment, decree, or order” shall 
include any affirmative recognition of a foreign judgment by a 
court of the United States. Such affirmative recognition by a court 
of the United States is entitled to full faith and credit in this state. 
This amendment expands the scope of the EFJA to conform with 
Louisiana’s obligations under the Full Faith and Credit Clause. By further 
defining the judgment, decree, or order of other courts to include sister-
recognized judgments, Louisiana affirmatively provides this constitutional 
guarantee to judgment creditors. Moreover, the second added sentence 
serves to prevent litigation attempting to draw a line between sister-state 
recognitions entitled to full faith and credit and those that are not entitled 
to full faith and credit.308  The language removes such challenges by 
providing that sister-recognized judgments are inherently entitled to full 
faith and credit. 
 
 307. The Supreme Court has denied the “back door” argument, which is the 
theory that lends support to denying sister-recognized judgments. See Williams v. 
North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 302 (1942). So has Texas. Reading & Bates Constr. 
Co. v. Baker Energy Res. Corp., 976 S.W.2d 702, 715 (Tex. App. 1998).  
 308. A party may assert that only certain courts’ judgments, decrees, or orders 
recognizing foreign judgments are entitled to full faith and credit in Louisiana. 
The criteria used to determine which courts’ recognitions are entitled to full faith 
and credit in Louisiana could include, for example, whether the recognizing state 
has a recognition law similar to Louisiana’s—or a recognition law at all.  
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9572020] COMMENT
The legislature would not need to further amend Code of Civil
Procedure article 2541. Article 2541 already provides that any judgment
entitled to full faith and credit is enforceable through the EFJA. The
EFJA’s amendment, stating that sister-recognized judgments are entitled
to full faith and credit, links article 2541 to the EFJA.
CONCLUSION
Adopting the 2005 Recognition Act with the proposed changes would
give judgment creditors an alternative to Louisiana’s burdensome ordinary 
proceeding,309 which subjects successful judgment creditors to a second
due-process hearing.310 A statutory approach is preferable to piecemeal
judicial opinions because it provides litigants with greater clarity on more
issues and does not force Louisiana litigants to put the enforceability of their
judgments at stake to develop the recognition law. The Full Faith and Credit
Clause was essential to the United States’ economic growth during the
1900s, and the Uniform Law Commission promulgated the first EFJA to
codify the states’ obligation.311 In today’s global economy, parties are
increasingly dependent on international trade,312 and the Uniform Law
Commission has promulged a foreign judgment Recognition Act.313 The
Louisiana Legislature adopted the EFJA in 1985 to give sister-state
309. Baker, 20 So. 3d at 1117–20.
310. An important distinction between the original and second trial, however,
is that the first trial is centered on the merits of the original cause of action,
whereas the second trial hinges on whether the foreign judgment should be
recognized under principles of comity. REVISED UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF
FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT, Prefatory Note (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1964) (“While 
there is no constitutional requirement that a debtor who has had a full due process
trial in one state need be given a second full scale trial on the judgment in another
state, this is the only course generally available to creditors.”); Baker, 20 So. 3d 
at 1119 n.10 (noting that the plaintiff must file an action on the judgment and “is 
therefore subject to the same rules for pleading and trial . . . . And, in contrast to
the ex parte grant of a judgment under [the EFJA], a trial is required [in an
ordinary proceeding.]”).
311. UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
1948).
312. Rapture Shipping, Ltd. v. Allround Fuel Trading B.V., 350 F. Supp. 2d
369, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“The importance of extending comity . . . has only
increased as our economy has become increasingly global and dependent upon
international commerce.”).
313. UNIF. FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT §§ 3(a), 
4(a)–(b)(3) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2005); UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS
RECOGNITION ACT §§ 1(2), 2, 4(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1962).
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judgments a streamlined enforcement process,314 and it should do the same 
for foreign judgments in 2020. 
314. Act No. 464, 1985 La. Acts 882 (codified at LA. REV. STAT. §§ 13:4241– 
47 (2016)).
